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THE PARADOX THAT WASN’T: FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW
VOICE MISAPPROPRIATION CLAIMS
ZACHARY M. VAUGHAN*

INTRODUCTION
In 2003, after hearing samples of her song “Very Special”1 used in a Jennifer
Lopez song,2 Debra Laws sued, claiming that her identity—her voice—had been
misappropriated.3 Even after learning that her record label had consented to the
sampling,4 Laws fully expected to win her lawsuit. After all, courts had almost
uniformly offered protection to artists’ voices,5 and one court had even held that
merely imitating someone’s voice was actionable.6 Surely, Laws thought, actually
using someone’s voice, as the defendants had used hers, would be protected by the
law. But in 2006, the Ninth Circuit denied her claim, explaining that her lawsuit
was preempted by federal copyright law for the very reason that it had seemed so
strong in the first place: because the defendants had used an actual recording of her
voice, instead of merely imitating it, allowing her to seek the protection of state law
would violate the preemption provision of the Copyright Act.7
This article attempts to square this circle, and to solve what seems like a
paradox in the law of copyright preemption as applied to claims for misappropriation
of voice: that cases involving actual uses of a plaintiff’s voice, like Debra Laws’s,
have been held to be preempted by the Copyright Act, while cases involving mere
imitation of a plaintiff’s voice have been allowed to proceed. This article argues that
this apparent paradox is actually no conflict at all. Part I presents a brief
introduction to the unique status of music under federal copyright law, as well as
background on state-law right of publicity claims and a primer on federal preemption
law. Part II collects and explains cases where courts have been faced with voice
misappropriation claims under California’s right of publicity law and have decided
whether or not they are preempted by the Copyright Act. Part III discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of one possible harmonization of the case law presented by
one of the preeminent copyright scholars in America today. Finally, Part IV proposes
a new way to think about the cases, and explains why what seems like a conflict at
first glance is actually correct, both as a matter of federal preemption law and as a
normative matter.
* © Zachary M. Vaughan 2012. J.D., Georgetown Law; A.B., Dartmouth College. The author
would like to thank Julie Ross and Michael Huppe for their help in developing this article. Thanks
also to Andrea Fuelleman and the RIPL staff for their excellent editorial assistance.
1 DEBRA LAWS, Very Special, on VERY SPECIAL (Elektra Records 1981).
2 JENNIFER LOPEZ, All I Have, on THIS IS ME… THEN (Epic Records 2002).
3 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006).
4 Id.
5 See Mark S. Lee, Caveat Preemptor: Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., MANATT (July
27, 2006), http://www.manatt.com/news.aspx?id=4010.
6 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); see also infra Part II.A.
7 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1140–41.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part presents an introduction to the legal issues involved in voice
misappropriation claims:
copyright law, right of publicity law, and federal
preemption.

A. The Dual Nature of Copyright in Music
Under the Copyright Act, a musical recording, unlike a novel, a painting, or a
sculpture, is a combination of two separate, independently copyrightable works: the
underlying musical composition, and the particular performance fixed by the sound
recording itself.8 The scope of protection granted by the Act to each of these works
differs, however. Although section 106 of the Copyright Act (“section 106”) grants
full exclusive rights to copyright owners of “musical works,”9 an owner of the
copyright in a sound recording receives only a subset of those rights:10 the right to
reproduce the sound recording in copies or phonorecords,11 to prepare derivative
works based on the sound recording,12 to distribute copies or phonorecords to the
public,13 and to perform the sound recording in public “by means of a digital audio
transmission.”14
As an example, consider an advertising company who wishes to use a particular
song in a television or radio commercial. If the company wishes to use the original
recording of the song in its commercial, it must obtain two “synchronization licenses”
(licenses to synchronize music with other audio or visual content): one for the
musical composition, and one for the sound recording.15 If it wants to save money,
however, or if the owner of the copyright in the sound recording refuses to consent to
8 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006) (granting copyright protection to “musical works,
including any accompanying words”), with id. § 102(a)(7) (granting copyright protection to “sound
recordings”).
9 See id. § 106(1) (granting the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords”); id. § 106(2) (granting the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work”); id. § 106(3) (granting the exclusive right “to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending”); id. § 106(4) (granting the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work
publicly”); id. § 106(5) (granting the exclusive right “to display the copyrighted work publicly”).
10 See id. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are
limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not include any
right of performance under section 106(4).”).
11 Id. § 106(1).
12 Id. § 106(2). The derivative works right is limited only to those works “in which the actual
sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or
quality.” Id. § 114(b). The Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id. § 101.
13 Id. § 106(3).
14 Id. § 106(6).
15 See John M. Rolfe, Jr. & John E. Murdock III, On the Record: How Music Connects with
Law, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2006, at 17, 18.
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its use in the commercial, the advertiser may instead choose to record its own “cover”
version of the song. In that case, the advertiser must obtain a synchronization
license for the composition, but not the sound recording, even if the “cover” version
exactly imitates the sound recording to the point of being indistinguishable.16

B. Right of Publicity
Over forty states,17 including both New York18 and California,19 recognize the
right of publicity, either by statute, common law, or both. The right of publicity
protects “the right of a person whose identity has commercial value—most often a
celebrity—to control the commercial use of that identity.”20 Although it was
originally conceived of as a privacy tort,21 the right of publicity has evolved into a
property-like right that provides individuals with “quasi-ownership” of their
personas.22
California, which recognizes both statutory and common law right of publicity
claims,23 serves as a good example. To state a claim of common law misappropriation
of name and likeness, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant used his identity
without his consent, that the defendant benefited “commercially or otherwise,” and
that this resulted in injury to the plaintiff.24 Although this common law right
originally protected only name and likeness, not voice, courts have since interpreted
the “identity” element to protect against voice misappropriation, including vocal
imitations.25
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976) (“Mere imitation of a
recorded performance would not constitute a copyright infringement even where one performer
deliberately sets out to simulate another’s performance as exactly as possible.”).
17 See Ashley D. Hayes, The Right of Publicity and Protection of Personas: Preemption Not
Required, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2001).
18 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2010).
19 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344–3344.1 (West 2010); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr.
342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
20 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824–25 (9th Cir. 1974)).
21 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (recognizing, as part of a
“complex of four” privacy torts, “[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness.”).
22 See Sarah Schacter, The Barracuda Lacuna:
Music, Political Campaigns, and the First
Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 571, 587 (2011); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“The [California] statute protecting the use of a deceased person’s name, voice, signature,
photograph or likeness states that the rights it recognizes are ‘property rights.’ By analogy the
common law rights are also property rights. Appropriation of such common law rights is a tort in
California.”).
23 See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
24 Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (“A common law cause of action for appropriation of name or
likeness may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3)
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.”).
25 Geronimo Perez, A Recording Artist’s Right of Publicity in Today’s Advertising Environment:
What State Laws Give, the Copyright Act Takes Away, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 29, 32 (2003). Other
jurisdictions have accepted the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of the identity element. Id. at 33 n.29
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Unlike the common law right, California’s statutory right of publicity expressly
protects against commercial misappropriation of a person’s voice.26 This protection
only extends to actual uses of a person’s voice, however, and not to imitations or
soundalikes.27 The statute also expressly exempts from its coverage use “in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any
political campaign.”28
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,29 the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of state right of publicity laws. The plaintiff in the case, Hugo
Zacchini, was the performer of a “human cannonball” act whose performance was
recorded and broadcast by a local television news program without his consent.30
Zacchini brought a state-law action for conversion, claiming that the unauthorized
broadcast of his performance was an “unlawful appropriation” of his “professional
property.”31 The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent the
Ohio courts from recognizing a right of publicity claim:
If . . . [defendant] had merely reported that [Zacchini] was performing at the
fair and described or commented on his act, with or without showing his
picture on television, we would have a very different case. But [Zacchini] is
not contending that his appearance at the fair and his performance could
not be reported by the press as newsworthy items. His complaint is that
[defendant] filmed his entire act and displayed that film on television for
the public to see and enjoy. This, he claimed, was an appropriation of his
professional property.32
The Ohio courts were free to allow Zacchini to bring a right of publicity claim
because allowing such a right of publicity claim “would not serve to prevent
[defendant] from reporting the newsworthy facts” about Zacchini’s act.33

(citing Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (D.N.J. 2000); Carson v. Here’s Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)); see infra Part II.A.
26 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2010).
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes
of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods
or services, without such person’s prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the
prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
Id.
27 See Perez, supra note 25, at 33; see also Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (“The defendants did not use
Midler’s name or anything else whose use is prohibited by the statute. The voice they used was
Hedwig’s, not hers.”).
28 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d). These exemptions serve to permit enforcement of the statute
consistent with the First Amendment. See Perez, supra note 25, at 33–34.
29 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
30 Id. at 563–64.
31 Id. at 564.
32 Id. at 569.
33 Id. at 574.
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C. Federal Preemption
Because Zacchini did not consent to the recording of his performance, there was
no fixation under the Copyright Act, and so the Court never had to consider whether
Ohio’s right of publicity law was preempted by the Copyright Act.34 But because the
cases discussed in this article all involve recorded music, fixed on a tangible medium
of expression,35 federal copyright law comes into play. And because the United
States Constitution declares itself and all other federal laws to be the “supreme Law
of the Land,” state law stands subordinate to, and can be preempted by, federal law.36
This preemption can either be express, where a law explicitly declares that it
preempts state law, as the Copyright Act does in section 301;37 or implied.38

1. Express Preemption
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act (“section 301”) declares that “all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright . . . in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright . . . are governed
exclusively by this title,” which will preempt “any such right or equivalent right in
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”39 Courts that have
applied section 301 have adopted a two-part test: to invade the domain of copyright,
a law must (1) create “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright,” and (2) apply to “works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright.”40
Under section 301, a state law right is “equivalent” to copyright if it is violated
by “an act which, in and of itself, would infringe of the exclusive rights [of
copyright].”41 But when a state-law right of action is “predicated upon an act
incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the rights involved are

Id. at 574–75.
See infra Part II.
36 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
37 See 17 U.S.C § 301(a) (2006) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . and come
within the subject matter of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.”).
38 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 401–02 (3d ed.
2006).
39 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
40 Id.; see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (2010)
[hereinafter NIMMER].
41 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
34
35
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not equivalent and preemption will not occur.”42 Courts have called this analysis the
“extra element” test.43

2. Implied Preemption
The Supreme Court has held that the fact that a federal statute has an express
preemption provision does not foreclose the possibility of implied preemption.44
Implied preemption can take the form of “field preemption,” where a particular
federal law “occupies the field” in which it operates, and displaces all state laws
which try to do the same;45 or “conflict preemption,” which occurs if a particular state
law conflicts with the goals of federal law.46
In order to determine whether a given state law conflicts with the goals of
federal law, a court must determine (1) what exactly those federal goals are, (2) what
the goals and effects of the state law are, and (3) whether, taking everything into
account, the two laws are in conflict.47 Two older cases help illustrate the issue. In
Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission,48 the Supreme Court held that a state law
denying unemployment benefits to workers who filed unfair labor practice complaints
with the National Labor Relations Board was preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”).49
Because a key purpose of the NLRA was the
encouragement of such filings, the Florida law was held to conflict with federal
goals.50 Similarly, in Perez v. Campbell, the Court considered an Arizona law that
42 Id.; see also Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1993) (“To
avoid preemption, a cause of action defined by state law must incorporate elements beyond those
necessary to prove copyright infringement, and must regulate conduct qualitatively different from
the conduct governed by federal copyright law.”).
43 See, e.g., Trandes, 996 F.2d at 659.
44 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
45 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.
Id. (citation omitted). This so-called “field preemption” is rarely applicable in the copyright realm,
given the wide latitude states are generally given to regulate many aspects relating to copyrightable
works. See NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B].
46 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (explaining that preemption
may occur “when [a] state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress”).
47 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 414.
48 Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm’n., 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
49 Id. at 238.
50 Id. at 239 (“The action of Florida here, like the coercive actions which employers and unions
are forbidden to engage in, has a direct tendency to frustrate the purpose of Congress to leave people
free to make charges of unfair labor practices to the Board.”).
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suspended the licenses of drivers who failed to pay judgments arising from
automobile accidents, even if their debts had been discharged in bankruptcy.51 The
Court determined that this provision conflicted with “one of the primary purposes” of
federal bankruptcy law, which was to give debtors “a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”52 Allowing states to punish drivers for failing to pay debts that had
been discharged in bankruptcy would undermine this purpose, so the Court held the
law preempted.53

II. EXPLAINING THE CASE LAW
This Part examines four cases, all decided under California law, in which courts
grappled with the question of federal preemption of voice misappropriation claims.
These cases fall into two categories: state-law actions involving “soundalike”
recordings, which have survived preemption analysis, and state-law actions involving
actual uses of an artist’s recorded voice, which have been preempted under the
Copyright Act.

A. Soundalike Cases: Midler and Waits
In 1985, the advertising agency Young & Rubicam, Inc. created a series of
television commercials for the Ford Motor Company that it called “The Yuppie
Campaign.”54 The aim of the advertising campaign was to make an emotional
connection with yuppies, or “Young Urban Professionals,”55 and to accomplish this
goal, each of the nineteen commercials in the campaign included a different popular
song from the 1970s—the yuppies’ carefree college days.56 One of these songs was
Bette Midler’s version of “Do You Want to Dance,”57 a Bobby Freeman song from the
1950s58 that had previously been popularized by the Beach Boys.
Although Young & Rubicam attempted to get Midler’s permission to use her
recording, she refused,59 and so the agency turned instead to Ula Hedwig, a semi-

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 641–44 (1971).
Id. at 648.
53 Id. at 652.
54 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
55 See
Living:
Here
Come
the
Yuppies!,
TIME
(Jan.
09,
1984)
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952325,00.html (“Who are all those upwardly
mobile folk with designer water, running shoes, pickled parquet floors and $450,000 condos in semislum buildings? Yuppies, of course, for Young Urban Professionals.”); cf. MARISSA PIESMAN &
MARILEE HARTLEY, THE YUPPIE HANDBOOK: THE STATE-OF-THE-ART MANUAL FOR YOUNG URBAN
PROFESSIONALS (1984).
56 Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
57 BETTE MIDLER, Do You Want to Dance?, on THE DIVINE MISS M (Atlantic Records 1972).
58 BOBBY FREEMAN, Do You Want to Dance?, on DO YOU WANNA DANCE (Jubilee Records 1958).
59 Midler, 849 F.2d at 461. The conversation, as recounted by Judge Noonan in the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion, was an abbreviated one: “‘Hello, I am Craig Hazen from Young and Rubicam. I
51
52
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professional singer who had served as a backup singer to Midler for ten years.60
Hedwig was told to “sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record,” and by
all accounts, she was successful—after the commercial aired, Midler was informed
that it “sounded exactly” like her recording, and Hedwig was told by her friends that
they thought it was Midler singing in the commercial.61
Midler sued, claiming that Ford and Young & Rubicam violated her right of
publicity under California law by imitating her voice so successfully.62 The district
court, which described the defendants’ conduct as that of the “average thief,”
nevertheless granted summary judgment to defendants.63 A panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding instead that California’s common-law right of publicity is
violated “when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product.”64 Rebuffing defendant’s claim that
Midler’s action was preempted by federal copyright law, the court reasoned that
“[c]opyright protects ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.’ A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’ What is put
forward as protectable here is more personal than any work of authorship.”65
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Waits v. FritoLay, Inc.,66 a lawsuit over a radio commercial for “SalsaRio Doritos” inspired by the
1976 Tom Waits song “Step Right Up.”67 As in Midler, the talent search for the
Doritos commercial at issue in Waits focused primarily on finding a singer who could
accurately imitate Tom Waits’ “raspy, gravelly singing voice.”68 In fact, the singer
who got the job, Stephen Carter, was initially warned that “he probably wouldn’t get
the job because he sounded too much like Waits, which could pose legal problems.”69
This warning proved to be accurate: after hearing the commercial during an
appearance on a Los Angeles radio program, Waits was “shocked,” and immediately
filed suit against Frito-Lay and its advertising agency, alleging California state-law
voice misappropriation, along with federal unfair competition claims under the

am calling you to find out if Bette Midler would be interested in doing . . . ?’ Edelstein: ‘Is it a
commercial?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘We are not interested.’” Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 461–62; see Ford Motor Co., 1986 Mercury Sable TV Commercial, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21,
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjIstCzsppA.
62 Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
Because Young & Rubicam had obtained a license from the
copyright holder of the song, and had not actually used any part of Midler’s recording in its
commercial, there was no copyright issue in the case. See id. (“Midler does not seek damages for
Ford’s use of ‘Do You Want To Dance,’ and thus her claim is not preempted by federal common
law. . . . A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’”).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 463.
65 Id. at 462 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)).
66 Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
67 TOM WAITS, Step Right Up, on SMALL CHANGE (Asylum Records 1976); see also Waits, 978
F.2d at 1097, 1097 & n.1 (noting the irony of basing a Doritos commercial on this song, “a jazzy
parody of commercial hucksterism, and consists of a succession of humorous advertising pitches”
that the artist had characterized as an “indictment of advertising.”).
68 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097–98.
69 Id. Frito-Lay’s advertising agency had not attempted to obtain permission from Waits, who
had a consistent, publically-expressed policy of never doing commercials. Id. at 1097.
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Lanham Act.70 A jury, after finding that Waits had a “distinctive” voice (as required
under Midler), and that the defendants’ commercial had violated Waits’ right of
publicity by featuring a “deliberate imitation” of his voice, awarded Waits $375,000
in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages on the state-law claim,
along with $100,000 in damages for violation of the Lanham Act.71
The defendants appealed, mounting both collateral and direct attacks on the
continuing validity of Midler.72 The defendants first claimed that Midler had been
“impliedly overruled” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,73 which had held that a Florida statute giving perpetual
patent-like protection to boat hull designs already on the market was preempted by
federal patent law, and which the defendants “seize[d] upon” as standing for
“sweeping preemption principles.”74 The court rejected this argument, pointing out
that Bonito Boats had itself cautioned against reading the Court’s patent preemption
cases as establishing a “broad pre-emptive principle,”75 and that the Court had
explicitly recognized states’ authority to protect entertainers’ right of publicity in
Zacchini.76
Undaunted, the defendants asked the court to reconsider Midler anyway,
arguing, as the defendants did in Midler itself,77 that voice misappropriation was
preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act.78 The court declined this invitation,79
70

Id. at 1098; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.

Id.
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
Id. at 1099–1100.
73 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
74 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099.
75 Id.; see Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165.
Our decisions since Sears and Compco have made it clear that the Patent and
Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication, deprive
the States of the power to adopt rules for the promotion of intellectual creation
within their own jurisdictions. Thus, where ‘Congress determines that neither
federal protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the national interest,’
the States remain free to promote originality and creativity in their own domains.
Id. (citation omitted).
76 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099–1100; see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
77 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100. According to the text of the court’s opinion, the defendants based
their preemption argument on section 114 of the Act, not section 301. See id. (“The defendants ask
that we rethink Midler anyway, arguing as the defendants did there that voice misappropriation is
71
72
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for two reasons. First, it pointed out that Waits’s claim, like Bette Midler’s, was for
“infringement of voice, not for infringement of a copyrightable subject such as a
sound recording or musical composition.”80 Second, the court quoted from the
legislative history of section 301,81 which expressed the intent of Congress that “[t]he
evolving common law rights of ‘privacy,’ ‘publicity,’ and trade secrets . . . remain
unaffected [by the preemption provision] as long as the causes of action contain
elements, such as invasion of personal rights . . . that are different in kind from
copyright infringement.”82 Because Waits’s voice misappropriation claim was based
on a “personal property right”—his right to “control the use of his identity as
embodied in his voice”83—and because the trial’s focus had been on the Midler
elements,84 which are “different in kind” 85 from those in a copyright infringement
case, the court held that Waits’s action was not explicitly preempted by the Copyright
Act.86 In the end, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict and damages on Waits’s right
of publicity claim.87

B. Actual Uses of Recordings: Fleet and Laws
In 1996, the California Court of Appeal decided Fleet v. CBS,88 in which the
court refused to allow a group of actors who had appeared in a copyrighted film to
bring a right of publicity claim to prevent the release of that film by its exclusive
rights holder, CBS.89 After completing work on the 1987 film “White Dragon,”
plaintiffs were involved in a fee dispute with a financing company that had stepped
in to ensure the film’s completion.90 When their efforts at obtaining their promised
preempted by section 114 of the Copyright Act.”). But section 114 makes no mention of preemption;
and in the following sentence, the court quotes “this provision,” but appends a correct citation to
section 301(b)(1). See id. Moreover, as Nimmer notes, the “legislative history of section 114” that
the court quotes in the following paragraph actually comes from section 301. See id.; NIMMER, supra
note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i].
79 Not that it could have done otherwise, of course. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 (“As a threejudge panel, we are not at liberty to reconsider this conclusion, and even if we were, we would
decline to disturb it.”).
80 Id.
81 Again, although the court claimed to be quoting from the legislative history of section 114,
the quoted material actually came from the legislative history of section 301. See supra note 78.
82 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
83 Id.
84 Id. (outlining the question as “whether the defendants had deliberately imitated Waits’s
voice rather than simply his style and whether Waits’ voice was sufficiently distinctive.”).
85 Id.
86 Id. As Nimmer points out, however, by confusing the legislative histories of sections 114 and
301, the court failed altogether to address any possible non-section 301 preemption of Waits’ voice
preemption claim. See NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i] (“Waits therefore misses the target
entirely—far from resolving non-section 301 preemption, it sets the analysis backwards by
conflating the legislative history from two wholly separate statutory sections.”).
87 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111. The court vacated Waits’s award of damages on the Lanham Act,
however, finding it duplicative of damages awarded for voice misappropriation. Id.
88 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
89 Id. at 646–47, 653.
90 Id. at 647.
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salaries proved unsuccessful, the plaintiffs wrote to CBS, informing them “that since
they had not been compensated for their appearances in the film, CBS did not have
permission to utilize their names, pictures, or likenesses in conjunction with any
exploitation of the film.”91 CBS ignored their letter and released the film anyway;
plaintiffs sued, alleging, among other things, that CBS had violated California’s right
of publicity statute by exploiting their performances without permission.92
The trial court granted summary to defendants on section 301 preemption
grounds, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.93 Unlike Bette Midler and
Tom Waits, who sued to protect their (non-copyrightable) voices, the plaintiffs in
Fleet sought to protect their (copyrightable) dramatic performances, as fixed in the
film itself.94 Because their right of publicity claim sought “only to prevent CBS from
reproducing and distributing their performances in the film,” the court held it to be
preempted by section 301.95 “There can be no question,” the court held on the first
prong of section 301, “that, once appellants’ performances were put on film, they
became ‘dramatic work[s]’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression’ . . . [and
therefore] came within the scope or subject matter of copyright law protection.”96 On
the second prong, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument, citing a series of California
cases (including Midler) for the proposition that “where the plaintiff neither owns,
nor claims to own, the copyright, there is no preemption . . . even though the medium
in which the offending misappropriation has occurred is itself copyrightable or even
copyrighted.”97 This argument failed, the court held, because plaintiffs had misread
the cases:
In each of the cited cases, the right sought to be protected was not
copyrightable—Clint Eastwood's likeness captured in a photograph;
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's former name; Bette Midler’s distinctive vocal style;
Vanna White’s distinctive visual image, etc. The plaintiffs in those cases
asserted no copyright claims because they had none to assert. Here, by
contrast, appellants seek to prevent CBS from using performances captured
on film. These performances were copyrightable and appellants could have
claimed a copyright in them.98
Because defendants had prevailed on both prongs of section 301, the court affirmed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, and held that
“[a] claim asserted to prevent nothing more than the reproduction, performance,
distribution, or display of a dramatic performance captured on film is subsumed by
copyright law and preempted.”99

Id.
Id.
93 Id. at 648, 653.
94 Id. at 650.
95 Id.
96 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)).
97 Id. at 651 (internal quotation omitted).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 653.
91
92
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Ten years later, the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion on the
preemption issue in Laws v. Sony Music,100 in which the court rejected a claim by
R&B singer Debra Laws for voice misappropriation based on the licensed sampling of
her song “Very Special”101 in the song “All I Have”102 by Jennifer Lopez and
L.L. Cool J.103 In 1979, Laws entered into a recording agreement with Elektra
Records in which she granted Elektra exclusive rights to her master recording of
“Very Special,” along with the right to use her name and likeness in connection with
the recording, but in which Elektra agreed not to use the recording in any
audiovisual work without Laws’s consent.104 In 2002, without permission from Laws,
Elektra granted Sony a non-exclusive license to use a sample of “Very Special” in “All
I Have,” which was released on CD and in music video form that year.105
In February 2003, Laws brought an action in California state court, alleging
violations of both her common law and statutory rights of publicity under California
law.106 Sony removed the case to federal court and brought a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court granted, holding that both of Laws’s
misappropriation claims were preempted by section 301.107 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.108 In his opinion for the three-judge panel, Judge Bybee distinguished the
case from Midler and Waits by explaining that, in contrast to those two prior cases,
[W]here the licensing party obtained only a license to the song and then
imitated the artist’s voice, here Sony obtained a license to use Laws’s
recording itself. Sony was not imitating “Very Special” as Laws might have
sung it. Rather, it used a portion of “Very Special” as sung by Debra
Laws . . . . Although California law recognizes an assertable interest in the
publicity associated with one’s voice, we think it is clear that federal
copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappropriation of one’s voice
when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is
contained within a copyrighted medium.109
This conclusion was consistent with Midler and Waits, Judge Bybee reasoned,
because neither of the imitations in those two cases “was contained within a
copyrighted vocal performance.”110 “Moreover,” the court continued, “the fact that the
vocal performance was copyrighted demonstrates that what is put forth here as
protectable is not ‘more personal than any work of authorship.’”111

Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
DEBRA LAWS, Very Special, on VERY SPECIAL (Elektra Records 1981).
102 JENNIFER LOPEZ, All I Have, on THIS IS ME… THEN (Epic Records 2002).
103 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1135.
104 Id. at 1136.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1146.
109 Id. at 1140–41.
110 Id. at 1141.
111 Id. (quoting Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988)).
100
101
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III. NIMMER’S PROPOSED SOLUTION
In Chapter 1 of his preeminent treatise on copyright law, “Nimmer on
Copyright,” David Nimmer gives extended treatment to preemption of right of
publicity claims.112 Although he touches on the express (section 301) preemption
issue, Nimmer directs most of his effort to explaining the cases from the perspective
of implied (conflict) preemption. In doing so, he sets forth a theory that purports to
unify the cases and explain the seeming conflict between soundalike cases and
actual-use cases—that artists can receive state-law protection against soundalikes,
which only imitate their voices, but not against actual uses of their voices.113
Unfortunately, while Nimmer’s theory (mostly) succeeds at giving a plausible
explanation for why the cases came out the way they did, it does so in a way that
gives short shrift to the preemption issue, and ultimately confuses more than it
clarifies.
Nimmer begins his analysis of the right of publicity preemption issue with a
short discussion of section 301 preemption, where he agrees with Midler and Waits
that “[t]he ‘work’ that is the subject of the right of publicity is the persona, i.e., the
name and likeness of a celebrity or other individual.”114 A “persona” does not fall
within the subject matter of copyright,115 he argues, and cannot become a “work of
authorship” under the Act “simply because [it is] embodied in a copyrightable work
such as a photograph.”116 To Nimmer, however, all this proves is that “there is no
categorical preemption of the general right of publicity.”117 Later in the chapter, he
revisits the preemption issue, this time focusing on implied preemption, and there he
finds the situation to be much more complicated.118
Nimmer’s implied preemption analysis starts once more with Midler.119 This
time, however, he finds fault with the decision, arguing that it “fails to address the
key question at issue: Can a state law forbid that which Congress intended to
validate?”120 This congressional validation, he claims, is found in section 114(b) of
the Copyright Act, which limits the exclusive right of reproduction of sound
recordings “to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords
or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the
recording,”121 and thus excludes “soundalike” recordings from the reach of federal
copyright.122

See NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B].
See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I].
114 Id. § 1.01[B][1][c].
115 See id.
116 Id. (citation omitted).
117 Id. (emphasis added).
118 See id. § 1.01[B][3][b].
119 Id. § 1.01[B][3][b][i].
120 Id.
121 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006).
122 See id.; NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106
(1976) (“Mere imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute a copyright infringement
even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate another's performance as exactly as
possible.”).
112
113
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Of course, as Nimmer notes, this reading of section 114(b) could have two
possible implications:
If Congress intended solely to leave soundalike recordings untouched by
federal law, then state law may be allowed to step in and fill the breach.
Such a state law could prohibit the reproduction, performance, and
distribution of all soundalike recordings. By contrast, if Congress intended
further to legislate a policy affirmatively fostering such soundalike
recordings, then a contrary state law must be deemed pre-empted. The first
finding validates Midler, the second undermines it.123
But instead of answering this question, Nimmer proposes a third resolution of
Midler: “[I]f Congress intended to bar the states from the realm of regulating
soundalike recordings, except insofar as such recordings are used to sell an unrelated
product, then the court’s rationale survives a pre-emption challenge.”124 He
acknowledges, however, that it is “difficult to maintain” such a distinction without
specific evidence that Congress intended it.125
Nimmer then turns to Fleet, which “introduce[d] a sensibility wholly at odds”
with Midler and Waits,126 and then to Laws, which, he argues, reached the right
result, but on faulty reasoning.127 Here, Nimmer outlines the key aspect of Laws
that many have claimed represents a paradox:
Under the reasoning adopted by this opinion, “the fact that the vocal
performance was copyrighted demonstrates that what is put forth here as
protectable is not ‘more personal than any work of authorship.’” That logic
implies that, although Laws had no state law remedy for use of her actual
voice, she would have been able to pursue suit had Sony not used her
voice—for example, by hiring a singer who sounded exactly like Debra Laws
to accompany Jennifer Lopez, such that the public would find the two
indistinguishable. In other words, this opinion activated the law of
publicity only when the appropriation is towards the minimal side of the
spectrum, not when it is maximal. That consideration alone renders the
court’s distinction suspect.128
Finally, Nimmer takes up the challenge of reconciling the holdings of cases like
Midler, Waits, Fleet, and Laws.129 To do so, he seizes upon language from Seale v.
Gramercy Pictures,130 a Pennsylvania right of publicity case in which the court
NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i].
Id.
125 Id. Nimmer also concedes that a court has already considered and rejected this distinction.
Id. at n.606 (citing Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (C.D.
Cal. 1987)).
126 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][ii].
127 Id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iii].
128 Id. (quoting Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006)).
129 See id. See § 1.01[B][3][b][iv].
130 Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
123
124
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construed Pennsylvania’s right of publicity law with reference to the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition (“Restatement”), which limits liability for
misappropriation to those uses of a person’s identity that are “for the purposes of
trade.”131 According to the Restatement, a particular use qualifies as being “for the
purposes of trade” when the “name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity”
are used “in advertising the user’s goods or services, or are placed on merchandise
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered by the
user.”132 Non-commercial uses of a person’s identity, such as in “news reporting,
commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or advertising that is
incidental to such uses,”133 are specifically exempted from the Restatement’s
definition, however, and the comments note that “[u]se of another’s identity in a
novel, play, or motion picture is also not ordinarily an infringement.”134
To Nimmer, the line drawn by the Restatement “between entertainment works
used for their own sake and commercial works used for advertising purposes,”
“almost perfectly capture[s] how courts in this domain actually rule.”135 And when
we consider the cases as Nimmer instructs (“not between categories, but between
utilizations”), 136 the distinction holds true. In Midler (an advertisement for the 1986
Mercury Sable) and Waits (an advertisement for SalsaRio Doritos), the plaintiffs’
right of publicity claims were found not to be preempted by the Copyright Act;137 but
in Fleet (a movie) and Laws (a pop song), the claims were preempted.138
But the problem with Nimmer’s approach, at least insofar as it purports to be
about federal preemption, is that he never explains what exactly it has to do with
preemption in the first place. The only support Nimmer gives for his solution, other
than the fact that it happens to explain the case law, is the Restatement—a
document which, of course, is concerned with the merits of the underlying right of
publicity claim, not whether it is preempted by federal copyright law.139 In fact,
Nimmer admits that if courts choose to follow his approach, “the conflict between the
right of publicity and copyright can be resolved without recourse to pre-emption at
all.”140
It is only in cases where the underlying state law fails to make his artistic-vs.commercial distinction—that is, in cases involving state right of publicity laws that
apply to non-commercial misappropriations—that Nimmer suggests that “the line
drawn by the Restatement should be used to determine where copyright pre-emption
begins.”141 And yet even then, Nimmer fails to explain how exactly a state right of
publicity law that happens to encompass non-commercial uses of a plaintiff’s persona

131 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I]; see Seale, 949 F. Supp. at 336 (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995)).
132 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
133 Id.
134 Id. cmt. c.
135 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I].
136 Id.
137 See supra Part II.A.
138 See supra Part II.B.
139 See NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I].
140 Id.
141 Id.
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“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes or
objectives”142 of the Copyright Act.143 The only comparison Nimmer offers here is to
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,144 a case in which the Supreme
Court refused to read section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to create a cause of action for
misrepresentations about the “origin” of a work copied from the public domain and
redistributed to the public under a different name. “Just as the Supreme Court
warned [in Dastar] against ‘mutant copyright’ protection when it limited trademark
laws at their interface with copyrighted works,” Nimmer writes, “so courts
confronting the interface of right of publicity with copyrighted works must show
similar concern to limit the former to its appropriate parameters.”145
This is true, of course, but it begs the question. Ultimately, Nimmer’s attempt
to harmonize the caselaw is an admirable one, but it complicates things a good deal
more than is necessary. As the next Part will attempt to show, there is a much
simpler way to think about the preemption issue.

IV. AN ALTERNATE EXPLANATION
If Nimmer’s artistic-vs.-commercial distinction is the wrong way to think about
the apparent conflict between soundalike cases like Midler and actual-use cases like
Laws, what is the right way? This Part will argue that the two sets of cases are not
actually in conflict at all—that their outcomes, which may be counterintuitive, are
actually based on a principled distinction in the analysis of copyright preemption.
First, this Part demonstrates, based on section 301 and the principles of conflict
preemption, that the cases outlined in Part II were rightly decided. Second, this Part
defends this outcome from normative criticism, and explains that what seems like
unfairness in the law is actually no such thing.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
See supra section I.C.
144 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003).
The
defendant in Dastar took a 1949 television series about World War II that had passed into the public
domain, made minor changes to it, and re-released it under a different title while claiming to have
produced it. Id. at 26–27. Justice Scalia, interpreting the word “origin” in section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, acknowledged the appeal of the plaintiffs’ argument that consumers might be more
interested in the intellectual, as opposed to physical, origin of so-called “communicative product[s]”
than they would be of regular products, but nevertheless refused to “accord[] special treatment to
communicative products” because doing so would “cause[] the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of
copyright.” Id. at 33. “Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar’s representation of itself as
the ‘Producer’ of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work
conveyed by the videos,” he wrote, “allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation
would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to copy and to
use’ expired copyrights.” Id. at 34 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 165 (1989)).
145 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I] (quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34).
142
143
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A. Copyright Preemption: Soundalikes vs. Actual Uses

1. Actual Use Claims Are Preempted
Recall Nimmer’s argument above about the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Laws—
that it “activated the law of publicity only when the appropriation is towards the
minimal side of the spectrum, not when it is maximal.”146 At first glance, the
counterintuitive nature of the court’s approach makes this an appealing argument.
Why should Bette Midler’s claim succeed where Debra Laws’s fails, when Laws’s
voice was actually used, and Midler’s was only imitated? But when one remembers
that the real issue here is preemption, not the merits of the underlying right of
publicity claim, it becomes clear that the cases have been correctly decided.
The artistic-vs.-commercial argument that Nimmer uses to explain the cases
purports to be based on conflict preemption,147 but the actual-use cases (Fleet and
Laws) can more easily be understood by reference to the doctrine those cases actually
employed: express preemption under section 301 of the Copyright Act. Consider the
two elements of section 301 preemption: to invade the domain of copyright, a law
must (1) create “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright,” and (2) apply to “works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter
of copyright.”148 The Laws court considered the two prongs in reverse order, and held
first that Laws’s claim was within the subject matter of copyright because what she
was trying to protect was her own voice, fixed in a tangible medium of expression.149
Once that was established, the court disposed of the first prong by rebuffing Laws’s
contention that her right of publicity claim contained the “extra element” of use for a
commercial purpose.150
But as the court noted, Laws never disputed that the recording of her voice used
by Jennifer Lopez was a copyrighted sound recording fixed in a tangible medium of
Id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iii]; see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
148 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006); see supra Part I.C.
149 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1139–44 (9th Cir. 2006).
150 See id. at 1144.
The mere presence of an additional element (‘commercial use’) in section 3344 is
not enough to qualitatively distinguish Laws’s right of publicity claim from a
claim in copyright. The extra element must transform the nature of the action.
Although the elements of Laws’s state law claims may not be identical to the
elements in a copyright action, the underlying nature of Laws’s state law claims is
part and parcel of a copyright claim.
Id.; see also NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][1].
[I]f under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display,
no matter whether the law includes all acts or only some, will in itself infringe the
state-created right, then such right is pre-empted. But if qualitatively other
elements are required, instead of, or in addition to, the acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause
of action, then the right does not lie ‘within the general scope of copyright,’ and
there is no pre-emption.
Id. (second emphasis added).
146
147
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expression.151 Instead, Laws argued that “a copyright claim protects ownership
rights to a work of art, while a right of publicity claim concerns the right to protect
one’s persona and likeness,” and pointed to Midler for support.152 The court correctly
rejected this argument because it recognized that section 301 is about “rights . . . in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”153 That is, it
recognized that the level of generality at which a court should analyze a right of
publicity claim for purposes of the first prong of section 301 preemption is
determined by what exactly a plaintiff is claiming state-law protection. In Midler,
there was no particular, discrete representation of Bette Midler’s voice for which she
was claiming protection, because defendants had not actually used her voice; rather,
she was claiming state-law protection of the general concept of her voice. This might
represent a weaker claim than Laws’s on the merits,154 but for purposes of
section 301, this weakness was what saved Midler’s claim from preemption.

2. Soundalike Claims Are Not Preempted
As it turns out, the more difficult decisions to defend are not Fleet and Laws, in
which actual-use claims were found to be preempted by the Copyright Act, but Midler
and Waits, which held soundalike claims were not. These decisions have come under
two separate lines of attack: first, that they should have found preemption under
section 301,155 and second, that they conflict with the goals of section 114.156
In a 2007 article in the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology
Law, Joseph Bauer argued that the Midler and Waits courts erred on the “subject
matter of copyright” prong of the section 301 analysis:
In [Midler and Waits], the Ninth Circuit upheld both trial courts’ refusals to
dismiss these actions on preemption grounds for the simple reason that a
“voice is not copyrightable.” [But] the “subject matter of copyright” also
includes the uncopyrightable elements of copyrighted works. As recording
artists, both Midler and Waits had made numerous copyrighted sound
recordings, of which their distinctive voices were essential elements.
Laws, 448 F.3d at 1141.
Id.
153 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
154 Indeed, before the Midler court’s expansive interpretation of California’s common law right
of publicity expanded that cause of action to include sound-alikes. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text. Such claims would have failed as a matter of law in California under both the
common law and statutory rights of publicity. See Perez, supra note 25, at 33.
California’s Civil Code section 3344 prohibits the unauthorized use of another’s
name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness for advertising, selling, or
soliciting purposes. However, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Midler, section
3344 protects against the actual use of a person’s voice, but not against the use of
an imitation or a sound-alike.
Id.
155 See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 78–79 (2007).
156 See NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i].
151
152
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Rather than viewing the absence of protection for a performer’s voice as an
instance of a presumed “right” that somehow had fallen between the cracks
of the federal copyright regime, the better view is that any failure to permit
relief to Midler and Waits can be seen as part of the congressional design
regarding those creations that will, and those that will not, get protection
under either federal or state law.157
To a point, of course, Bauer is correct that “the ‘subject matter of copyright’ also
includes the uncopyrightable elements of copyrighted works.”158 But the problem
with his argument is that, as the legislative history of section 301 makes clear,
unfixed works are not included in the “subject matter of copyright,” and “are
therefore not affected by the preemption of section 301.”159 And although it is true
that “both Midler and Waits had made numerous copyrighted sound recordings, of
which their distinctive voices were essential elements,”160 what was at issue in each
of the two cases was not any one of those sound recordings, or any particular fixation
of their voices at all.161
A somewhat more persuasive argument against the preemption analysis in
Midler and Waits is the one based on the cases’ possible conflict with section 114(b) of
the Copyright Act, which limits the exclusive rights of reproduction and adaptation of
sound recordings to the “actual sounds fixed in the recording.”162 As the provision’s
legislative history explains, under section 114, “[m]ere imitation of a recorded
performance would not constitute a copyright infringement even where one
performer deliberately sets out to simulate another’s performance as exactly as
possible.”163 Commentators have seized upon this language to argue that section
114(b) represents an affirmative judgment on the part of Congress to allow, even to
promote, the existence of soundalike recordings, and that Midler and Waits frustrate
that judgment by permitting states to prevent soundalike recordings in certain
situations.164
Bauer, supra note 155, at 78.
Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976).
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories of
sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if it fails
to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in
originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain.
Id. See also id. at 52 (“[A]n unfixed work of authorship, such as an improvisation or an unrecorded
choreographic work, performance, or broadcast, would continue to be subject to protection under
State common law or statute, but would not be eligible for Federal statutory protection under
section 102.”).
159 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131.
160 Bauer, supra note 155, at 78.
161 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (“Waits’ claim, like Bette Midler’s, is
for infringement of voice, not for infringement of a copyrightable subject such as a sound
recording . . . .”).
162 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006); see supra Part I.A.
163 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106.
164 See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i] (“It is submitted that although [Midler’s]
reasoning validly applies Section 301 of the [Copyright] Act, it nonetheless fails to address the key
question at issue: Can a state law forbid that which Congress intended to validate?”); Bauer, supra
note 155, at 106.
157
158
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But as Nimmer recognizes, Congress could have made one of two judgments
about soundalike recordings when it passed section 114(b)—either that such
recordings should remain untouched by federal law, or that they should be actively
promoted.165 And nothing in the text or legislative history of section 114 states, or
even implies, that Congress wanted affirmatively to foster the creation of soundalike
recordings.166 Indeed, such a decision would come out of nowhere. Was the public in
the mid-1970s clamoring for more soundalike recordings? Was there a powerful
“soundalike lobby” demanding that its goods receive special solicitation? The better
reading of section 114(b) is that it simply reflects a congressional decision to limit the
extent to which federal law would protect the owners of the copyright in sound
recordings against soundalike recordings. To ascribe any broader purpose to section
114(b) would be to stretch the provision beyond recognition.

B. Contractual Protections Are Sufficient for Artists
If, as the previous section attempted to show, the current state of the law is the
correct one, and right of publicity claims based on actual uses of recordings should be
preempted while claims based on soundalikes should not be, there remains one
problem. Regardless of the correctness of Nimmer’s position on the preemption
question, his argument does resonate on a normative level: why should Bette
Midler’s claim, based only on a soundalike imitation of her voice, be recognized while
Debra Laws’s claim, based on an actual unauthorized use of her voice, is preempted?
Again, the answer lies in the realities of modern copyright law—this time, in its
intersection with contract law. Because Ford Motor Company never actually used
any portion of Bette Midler’s recording of “Do You Want to Dance,” they had no
licensing agreement with Atlantic Records for their use of the song—an agreement
that Midler might have been able to prevent via her contract with the label.167
Elektra Records, on the other hand, did agree to license Debra Laws’s recording of
“Very Special” for use in “All I Have.”168 This licensing agreement was actually in

[T]here is a strong federal interest in uniform national treatment of copyright—
uniformity both in the works that are protectable and what rights the copyright
owner will have therein, and in what is not protectable. The scope of protection
conferred, as well as the areas left unprotected and the rights not afforded, are
the product of extensive debates and multiple compromises, and they constitute a
deliberately crafted balance of interests. They reflect legislative judgments about
the rights of authors and owners of copyrights, and instances in which the
interests of users and potential creators of new works should prevail over those of
the copyright owner. These judgments will be severely impaired if state law can
provide a cause of action for, and thus, can prohibit, the same conduct that federal
law leaves unprotected, or alternatively, if state law limits the rights and
protections afforded by federal law.
Id. (citations omitted).
165 See NIMMER, supra note 40, § 1.01[B][3][b][i].
166 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106–07.
167 Midler did not write the song and therefore had no copyright interest in the musical work
underlying her recording. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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violation of Elektra’s original contract with Laws, in which the company agreed,
among other things, not to license Laws’s recording for use in any audiovisual works
without her prior consent.169
Thus, Laws demonstrates how what seems like an unfair inconsistency in the
cases is actually no such thing. Artists like Debra Laws can protect themselves
against unauthorized uses of their recordings by including provisions in their
recording contracts. Although Laws lost her right of publicity case against Sony
Music before the Ninth Circuit, she was not left without a remedy, and was able to
bring a separate suit against Elektra in state court for breach of contract.170 Artists
like Bette Midler, on the other hand, have no way of protecting themselves by
contract against unauthorized imitations of their sound recordings, because creation
of a soundalike recording does not require any authorization from their record
labels.171

V. CONCLUSION
The desire for fairness is a strong one in law—so strong, in fact, that it
sometimes leads courts and commentators to ignore the realities of what the law does
in favor of what they believe it should do. This article has attempted to show that in
this particular area of the law, the understandable temptation to ignore the
sometimes odd formalisms of copyright preemption in an attempt to harmonize the
cases is not only a misguided quest, but an unnecessary one. For while it may seem
like a backwards result at first glance, after considering the law of copyright
preemption and the ex ante contract positions of the artists involved, the current
state of the law is the result required by preemption law, and it is a fair one.

169

See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006).
Elektra also secured the right ‘to use and to permit others to use your name, the
Artist’s name . . . likeness, other identification, and biographical material
concerning the Artist . . . in connection with such master recordings.’
Notwithstanding these provisions, Elektra agreed that ‘we shall not, without your
prior written consent, utilize or authorize others to utilize the Masters in any socalled “audio-visual” or “sight and sound” devices intended primarily for home
use,’ and ‘we or our licensees shall not, without your prior written consent, sell
records embodying the Masters hereunder for use as premiums or in connection
with the sale, advertising or promotion of any other product or service.’

170

See id. at 1143 n.5.
See supra Part I.A.
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